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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Constitutional Law-Delegation of Nonjudicial
Duties to the North Carolina Superior Courts
Milk Commission v. Galloway1 inferentially raises a problem concerning the delegation of nonjudicial duties to the North Carolina
Superior Courts. Galloway was a milk producer adversely affected
by an order issued after hearing by the Milk Commission fixing the
rates for hauling milk from producer to distributor in several counties.
Galloway, who had received notice of the hearing, did not attend but
appealed from the order to the superior court. Pursuant to the North
Carolina Milk Commission Act,2 that court heard the matter de novo
and issued its own rate order which conformed to the Commission's
order.3 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the Milk
Commission Act constitutional as applied.
4
It is well settled, since the leading case of Nebbia v. New York,
that a state legislature in the exercise of the police power can regulate
the price of milk through an administrative board. The transportation
rates in the principal case were an increment of the price of milk and
thus within the area of regulation constitutionally granted to the Milk
Commission.
The court in the principal case stated that the appellant attacked the
power of the superior court to fix the transportation rates. An examination of the record on appeal, however, reveals that appellant's argument
was not based on the theory that the superior court was exercising
nonjudicial duties, but rather that the particular rates in question were
not authorized by the act. The court noted the appeal provision of the
act, 5 describing it as a "sedulous protection against abuse of power by the
Milk Commission," and concluded, "[W] e hold that the Milk Commission, and the Superior Court on appeal, had the power .. .to regulate
a-:d to fix transportationrates"0 for the hauling of milk in North Carolina.
N.C. 658, 107 S.E.2d 631 (1959).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-266.6 to -266.21 (Supp. 1959).
3Biltmore Dairies, distributor, had assigned its producers to routes served by its
trucks and charged the producers for transporting the milk from the farm to the
plant according to the average cost per cwt. on each route. The costs varied from
about seventeen cents per cwt. to about thirty-one cents per cwt. depending upon
the route. The average cost per cwt. for all milk transported was twenty-six cents.
The orders of both the Commission and the court decreed that Biltmore in the
future use the overall average cost per cwt. (here twenty-six cents) as the basis of
its hauling charge to the producers.
4291 U.S. 502 (1934).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.17 (Supp. 1959).
6249 N.C. at 667, 107 S.E.2d at 638. (Emphasis added.)
1249
2
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This language of the court points toward two interpretations of the
function of the superior court: first, that it is to guard against the abuse
of power by the Milk Commission, and second, that it may itself fix
rates and otherwise regulate the milk industry. Guarding against the
abuse of power by an administrative board is a traditional function of
the courts.7 The fixing of rates is usually held not to be a judicial function."
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities
as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed
already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation, on
the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is
the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative not judicial in kind .... 9
Nonjudicial duties in certain instances have been delegated to the
courts both directly and indirectly. An example of the direct grant of
nonjudicial duties to a court is found in State v. Hurber,10 where a
statute that authorized courts of record in West Virginia to hear pro'ceedings for the revocation of beer licenses was found to give the courts
legislative power and was declared unconstitutional. A direct imposition of a nonjudicial function such as deciding whether a beer license
should be revoked is obvious enough. An indirect method of imposition
where, as indicated by the principal case, the court's scope of review
of administrative action is enlarged by statute is not so easily recognized.
The Connecticut court, recognizing this latter type of imposition, has
limited the review of administrative action to the single question: "Did
the board act illegally ?""
Several states whose constitutional provisions concerning the separation of governmental powers are basically the same as those in the
7 "The court has inherent authority to review the discretionary action of any
administrative agency, whenever such action affects personal or property rights,
upon a prima facie showing ... that such agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously,
or in disregard of law." In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 587, 46 S.E.2d 696, 698
(1948). For a discussion of the function of the courts in reviewing administrative
action see DAvis, ADmINIsTRATv LAW §§ 244-57 (1951).
'But see People v. Willcox, 194 N.Y. 383, 87 N.E. 517 (1909), where rate
fixing was held to be a judicial function.
'Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
See also Administrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001

(1958).

W. Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11 (1946).
an appeal from an administrative board . . . the function of the court
is to determine whether or not it acted illegally ....
Where upon an appeal the
court hears evidence it is solely for the purpose of determining that question . .. ;
even where a statute required that an appeal should be tried de novo, we held
that the court should make an independent inquiry into the facts but only for the
purpose of exercising that function." Jaffe v. State Dep't of Health, 135 Conn.
339, 353-54, 64 A.2d 330, 337-38 (1949).
10129

""On
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North Carolina Constitution have considered the problem of delegation
of nonjudicial duties to the courts. There is a wide diversity of opinion,
however, as to what duties may be delegated to state courts. In the
field of local government it has been held that courts may be empowered
to grant certificates of incorporation to municipalities,' 2 determine the
existence of facts which would warrant the creation of a water district,13
erect and divide political subdivisions,' 4 and appoint persons to investigate county and municipal affairs.' 5 Whether the foregoing functions
may be classified as judicial is seriously doubted. On the other hand,
courts cannot be authorized to determine if the annexation of an area
was in the public interest or convenience,' 6 or to fix, within certain limits,
the salaries of the court's medical officer, probation officer, and secretarial staff.' 7 In the field of utility regulation it has been held that the
courts could not fix rates,' 8 or otherwise regulate utilities;19 yet one
decision has intimated that courts can perform these duties.20 It is
generally held that courts may not issue licenses for the operation of a
constitutional for the lower Georgia
business ;21 however, it was held
22
courts to grant liquor licenses.
When called upon to exercise a nonjudicial function, some courts
have felt constrained by the exigencies of the particular case to perform
the inappropriate duty. For example, in In the Matter of Town of
Chesapeake many towns had been incorporated by the West Virginia
circuit courts under a statute that authorized those courts to issue a
certificate of incorporation upon the petitions of local citizens. The
appellate court recognized that the circuit courts were performing
patently nonjudicial duties; however, it upheld the statute on grounds
of public policy to avoid rendering doubtful the legal existence of many
towns.
13 In the Matter of Town of Chesapeake, 130 W. Va. 527, 45 S.E.2d 113 (1947).
Culley v. Pearl River Industrial Comm'n, 234 Miss. 788, 108 So. 2d 390

(1959).
1, In the Matter of Borough of Pottstown, 187 Pa. Super. 313, 144 A.2d 623
(1958) (Court of Quarter Sessions had performed this function since the earliest
days of the Commonwealth.).
' Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 71 A.2d 327 (1950).
11 Ritche v. City of Brookhaven, 217 Miss. 860, 65 So. 2d 832 (1953).
17 State ex rel. Richardson v. County Court of Kanawha County, 138 W. Va.
885, 78 S.E.2d 569 (1953).
" Public Serv. Comm'n v. City of Indianapolis, 235 Ind. 70, 131 N.E2d 308
(1956).
9

2 Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 248 Iowa 1201, 85
N.W.2d
28 (1957).
20
Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Util. Bd., 40 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1949) (dictum).
" Langen v. Badlands Co-op. State Grazing Dist., 125 Mont. 302, 234 P.2d 467
(1951); Peterson v. Livestock Comm'n, 120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 152 (1947);
State v. Hurber, 129 W. Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11 (1946).
22 Carrol v. Wright, 131 Ga. 728, 63 S.E. 260 (1908).
23130 W. Va. 527, 45 S.E.2d 113 (1947).
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Another factor has influenced courts which have accepted nonjudicial duties. Under the doctrine of separation of powers a spirit of
co-operation must exist between the branches of government in order
for the parts to function as a whole. At times, therefore, the courts
have acted as legislative agents. In New Jersey the court did s6 by
appointing persons to investigate corruption at the local level. In holding the delegation valid, the court stated,
A legislative request . . . for the judiciary to act with respect
to any particular subject matter is not to be lightly declined and
such matters are to be passed upon . . . in the spirit of comity
24
that should prevail between the three branches of government.
It is difficult to ascertain North Carolina's position on the performance of nonjudicial duties by its superior courts. The only case
directly concerned with this point, In re Wright,2 5 held that the superior
court could conduct a trial de novo in reviewing the discretionary
suspension of a driver's license. The court recognized that the inherent
authority of the courts in reviewing administrative action26 had been
enlarged by the provision for this statutory appeal and found "that
the Legislature had full authority to impose this additional jurisdiction
upon the courts ....
,,27 Then the supreme court stated that this
jurisdiction did not constitute a delegation of legislative or administrative authority and that the superior court could not substitute its discretion for that of the administrative body, thus implying that such a
delegation would be invalid. The court held that discretion to revoke
was not in the superior court which determined only whether the license
was subject to revocation. If so, the superior court does not decide
whether or not to revoke but affirms the administrative determination.
It is submitted that the Milk Comimssion Act, as interpreted in the
principal case, may have unwittingly provided through the appellate
process a procedure whereby nonjudicial functions are imposed on the
superior courts. This cannot be reconciled with the constitutional
separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. 28 The
superior courts are not the proper bodies for the regulation of an industry in the first instance, and the function should not be assumed
on appeal. Neither comity between the branches of government nor
the exigencies of regulating the price of milk require the imposition
of such an inappropriate burden upon the crowded dockets of our
superior courts. The General Assembly might well consider rewording
"Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 61, 71 A.2d 327, 331 (1950).
228 N.C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696 (1948).
"See note 7 supra.
' 228 N.C. at 587, 46 S.E.2d at 698.
"N.C. CoNsr. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1; art. IV, § 2.
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29

the appeal provision of the Milk Commission Act to prevent such an
occurrence. The appeal provisions of the Virginia Milk Commission
Act30 limit the court to determining if the order appealed is within
the discretion vested in the Commission, and if so, whether the Commission has exercised a reasonable discretion or the order is unreasonable
or capricious. Legislative action would not be required, however, if
the supreme court were to adopt the Connecticut court's concept of
the purpose of a trial de novo on appeal from an administrative body8 '
and limit the superior courts to the determination of the single question "Has the Commission acted illegally?"

G.

DUDLEY HUMPHREY, JR.

Bankruptcy-Survival of Liability for Willful and Malicious Injury
The Bankruptcy Act' operates as a discharge or release of a bankrupt
from all his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are
excepted in the act, and has as its purpose to relieve the honest debtor
from the weight of oppressive indebtedness with leave to start afresh. 2
Where the liability or debt is the result of a judgment arising out of
automobile accidents the idea of discharge has met with considerable
criticism. This criticism may be illustrated by the language of a New
York case where it was said:
If the court were permitted to do moral justice instead of legal
justice it would refuse to discharge the bankrupt of the judgments.
There are too many accidents resulting in judgments which are
wiped out in bankruptcy. The practice has grown up wherein a
person will negligently operate his automobile and then when a
judgment for such injuries is rendered against him, will obtain the
protection of the Bankruptcy Law by filing a voluntary petition
in bankruptcy . . . Operators of automobiles may drive in a
careless and negligent manner and go unscathed of justice by
filing a petition in bankruptcy.'
Although liabilities which are the result of willful and malicious
injuries to person or property are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, 4 the
courts are by no means in accord as to what constitutes willful and
malicious conduct. Most of the cases seem to lie between the areas
29
N.C. Gm. STAT. § 106-266.17 (Supp. 1959).
2
0 VA. CoDE §§

3-369 to -371 (1950).

"' See note 11 supra.
'Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended by 66 Stat. 420
(1952), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1086 (1958).
'Williams
v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
3
Francine v. Babayan, 45 F. Supp. 321, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
4 Bankruptcy Act ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958).
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where the injury is produced by ordinary negligence and where it is the
result of a deliberate and intentional wrongdoing. A majority of
cases have decided that no degree of negligence can produce a willful and
malicious injury.5 This view is buttressed by the theory that exceptions
tend to impair the bankrupt's remedy, and that since the statute is
highly remedial, these exceptions should be so construed as to affect
that remedy only so far as is necessarily required by its express terms.'
The modem trend, however, favors the interpretation that "willful
and malicious injuries to the person," as used in the act, does not
necessarily connote ill will or special malice, but describes a wrongful
act done in utter disregard of the legal rights of others and without
just or lawful support, evidencing a reckless disregard and indifference
to the safety of human life resulting in injury to the person or property
of another. This view is based on the theory that bankruptcy should
7
not be allowed to function as a refuge for reckless drivers.
It appears that North Carolina would follow the modern trend.
Our court has considered the question of what is willful and malicious
in deciding cases under our civil arrest statute s and in cases involving
punitive damages. In a case0 where the evidence tended to show that
defendant was driving an automobile at an excessive rate of speed near
the center of a populous town on Sunday, at the time people were going
to church, and ran on the sidewalk striking plaintiff, our court found
these facts sufficient for a jury to find an intent on the defendant's part
willfully to injure the plaintiff, justifying civil arrest of defendant. The
court adopted as one of the definitions of willfulness and wantonness:
"[N]egligence so gross as to manifest a reckless indifference to the
rights of another."10 The court also cited as a correct charge to the
jury the following:
To establish the charge of willfulness .. an actual intent to do
the particular injury alleged need not be shown; but if you find
from all the evidence that the misconduct of the defendant's
529 REP. J.70 (1955).

COLLIER, BANKRUPTcY 1609 (14th ed. 1940).
7 29 REP. J. 70 (1955).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-410 (1953).
"The defendant may be arrested . . . in
the following cases: 1. In an action . . .not arising out of contract where the
'1

action is for wilful, wanton, or malicious injury to person . ..."
o Weathers v. Baldwvin, 183 N.C. 276, 111 S.E. 183 (1922) ; accord, Foster v.

Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 148 S.E. 36 (1929), where defendant while drunk drove his
automobile on the wrong side of a city street where traffic was heavy. The court

held this sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that the injury was inflicted willfully and wantonly, and thus an order for execution against the person or defendant
was proper. In Braxton v. Matthews, 199 N.C. 484, 154 S.E. 735 (1930), it was

held that driving recklessly while intoxicated was sufficient to warrant the submission of an issue as to willful, wanton conduct and to sustain an affirmative answer

thereto.
"0Weathers v. Baldwin, 183 N.C. 276, 279, 111 S.E. 183, 185 (1922).
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servants was such as to evince an utter disregard of consequences,
so as to inflict the injury complained of, this may of itself tend
to establish wilifullness. 11
In general, punitive damages may not be recovered in a case involving ordinary negligence in the absence of any intentional, malicious,
or willful act. Wanton conduct, i.e., intentional wrongdoing, is a
sufficient basis for an award of punitive damages. North Carolina
has held conduct to be wanton when in conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others. 12 That
North Carolina shares the modern view and does not require a showing
of special malice or intent to injure a particular person 13 is further
borne out by the requirements for allegations sufficient for an award of
punitive damages which are said to be:
[T]he complaint must allege facts showing . . . circumstances
which would justify the award, for instance, actual malice, or
oppression, or gross and wilful wrong, or wanton and reckless
disregard of plaintiff's rights.'4
Most courts tend to brand certain specified acts of negligence as
sufficient to bring the liability within the scope of the exceptions of section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, where it appeared that the bankrupt was driving on the wrong side of the road,15 deliberately disregarding a traffic signal, 16 and passing another car while it was impossible
to see aheady' courts have held the resulting liability to be nondischargeable. However, the acts of speeding,' 8 passing a streetcar or
school bus,19 colliding with a parked car,20 or negligently crossing a
railroad track 2' have been held not to entail sufficient disregard for the
safety of others to be classified as willful and malicious. The most recent
21 Id. at 279-80, 111 S.E. at 185.
"Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E.2d 393 (1956).
" In Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 148 S.E. 36 (1929), it was held that
willfullness may be constructive, and where the wrongdoer's conduct is so reckless

as to amount to a disregard for the safety of others it is equivalent to actual intent.
1 Lutz Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 344, 88 S.E.2d 333, 342
(1955).

(Emphasis added.)

"Its re Dutkiewicz, 27 F.2d 334 (W.D.N.Y. 1928); Margulies v. Garwood,
36 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Doty v. Rogers, 213 S.C. 361, 49 S.E.2d 594
(1948).

" Tharpe v. Breitowich, 323 Ill. App. 261, 55 N.E.2d 392 (1944), cert. denied,

323 U.S. 801 (1945). Contra, I; re Longdo, 45 F.2d 246 (N.D.N.Y. 1930).
"1Margulies v. Garwood, 36 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1942). Contra, Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.2d 664 (1947) (restating the old rule).

" Freedman v. Cooper, 126 N.J.L. 177, 17 A.2d 609 (1941); Campbell v.
Norgart, 73 N.D. 297, 14 N.W.2d 260 (1944).
" In re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ga. 1936); Wyka v. Benedicks, 266
App. Div. 1025, 44 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1943).

" Campbell v. Norgart, 73 N.D. 297, 14 N.W.2d 260 (1944) ; Prater v. King,

73 Ga. App. 393, 37 S.E.2d 155 (1946).
" Nunn v. Drieborg, 235 Mich. 383, 209 N.W. 89 (1926).
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cases show that the uncertainty still exists as to driving when intoxicated, but the trend, at least in the federal courts, seems to be toward
holding this misconduct sufficient for a finding of willful and malicious
22
conduct.
Assuming a close case where the court would be justified either in
finding or in not finding willful and malicious conduct, counsel for both
sides should decide what effect a bankruptcy by defendant would have
on his client and how best to gain or avoid the benefits or handicaps of
such bankruptcy. What should the plaintiff allege in his complaint?
A judgment which is not based on an allegation or willful and malicious
conduct is seldom declared to be based on a wrongdoing of such
gravity as to justify denying a discharge.2 The complaint is of particular importance in a jurisdiction such as North Carolina where specific issues are submitted to the jury and the jury responds to issues and
does not find a general verdict.24 In order for counsel to have the trial
judge instruct the jury as to willful and wanton conduct such conduct
must be alleged in the complaint.25 However, allegations in the complaint are not alone sufficient to insure the submission of an issue as to
willfulness and malice to the jury. Before an issue can be submitted
to the jury, it must be supported by the evidence. 26 Thus it is said
that in civil actions the issues are framed on both the pleadings and
the evidence32 A trial judge in his charge to the jury should present
every substantial and essential feature of the case embraced within
the issue and arising on the evidence, and this without any special
28
prayer for instructions to that effect.
In a jurisdiction such as North Carolina that uses the issue system
the failure of counsel to cause an issue on willful and malicious conduct
to be submitted to the jury can be disastrous even though he has correctly pleaded such conduct and has supported his allegations with
proof.29 In a late New York case8 ° plaintiff's counsel asked the
"' Den Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72 (10th Cir. 1955).
2329 R F.J. 70 (1955).

"'Witsell v. West Asheville & S.S. Ry., 120 N.C. 557, 27 S.E. 125 (1897).
"Wilson v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 142 N.C. 333, 55 S.E. 257 (1906).
" Carland v. Allison, 221 N.C. 120, 19 S.E.2d 245 (1942) ; Henderson v. At626 (1916).
lantic Coast Line R.RL, 171 N.C. 397, 88 S.E.
7Crouse v. Vernon, 232 N.C. 24, 59 S.E.2d 185 (1950).

Griffin v. United
28 Smith v. Kappas, 219 N.C. 850, 15 S.E.2d 375 (1941).
Services Life Ins. Co., 225 N.C. 684, 36 S.E.2d 225 (1945), holds that it is the right
of counsel to have proper issues submitted. G.S. § 1-200 provides that it is the
duty of the attorneys in the case to prepare the issues arising upon the pleadings
and present them to the judge, to be by him submitted to the jury if approved.
This rule is mandatory, but if for any reason counsel does not so submit the
issues it is then the duty of the trial judge to frame the issues.
2" In Crowder v. Stiers, 215 N.C. 123, 1 S.E.2d 353 (1939), it was held that in
order to warrant execution against the person in an action for tort it is necessary
that there be an affirmative finding by the jury upon a separate issue of express
or actual malice. Accord, McKinney v. Patterson, 174 N.C. 483, 93 S.E. 967
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trial court to charge the jury respecting wanton negligence, but the
court refused to do so on the ground that plaintiff need prove only
ordinary negligence in order to recover. The jury rendered its verdict
for the plaintiff and the court expressed the opinion that defendant's
act came close to wanton negligence. On motion by defendant for an
order discharging the judgment against him the judgment was held not
to be based on willfull and malicious injury and thus to be dischargeable
in bankruptcy. The appellate court held that despite the trial court's
opinion, the jury's verdict was conclusive only as to the fact that defendant was negligent and that to be non-dischargeable the judgment
roll must show that the judgment was based on a willful and malicious
wrong.
The submission of proper issues is also vitally important to the
defense counsel. If a verdict is ambiguous in its terms, the ambiguity
may sometimes be explained and the verdict interpreted by reference to
and in connection with pleadings, evidence, and the charge of the trial
court.3 1 So if plaintiff's attorney has alleged willful and malicious conduct and has put on evidence to support his allegations it could be unsafe
for the defendant to fail to submit the specific issue. New York has held
in determining whether a judgment is dischargeable in bankruptcy, resort
may be had to the entire record to determine the wrongful character
of the act on which the judgment was based, and the form or allegations
of the complaint are not conclusive.3 2 The Minnesota court has gone
so far as to allow a judgment creditor to show by evidence extrinsic to
the record the non-dischargeable character of the original obligation,
notwithstanding the fact that the judgment roll on its face did not show
that it was a debt not dischargeable in bankruptcy.s
Thus it appears that if the North Carolina court, since there are no
North Carolina decisions in this area, resorts to other jurisdictions in
formulating decisions on this facet of the bankruptcy law the only safe
course for both plaintiff and defendant is to be sure the issue of willful
34
and malicious conduct is submitted to the jury for determination.
(1917), holding that before execution against a tortfeasor can issue it is necessary
that the jury find affirmatively upon an issue as to whether the tortious act was
done willfully. The court enunciated the general rule as being that a party cannot
object after the time for submitting issues has passed, and certainly not after the
verdict, that an issue, for which he made no request, was not submitted by the
court. In Turlington v. Aman, 163 N.C. 555, 79 S.E. 1102 (1913), it was held that
in order to issue an execution against the person of the defendant in cases where it
is permissible, the cause of arrest must be pleaded and proved and judgment
rendered.
" Thibadeau v. Lonschein, 186 N.Y.S.2d 73 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Cody v. England, 216 N.C. 604, 5 S.E.2d 833 (1939).
Proctor Sec. Corp. v. Handler, 162 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
33
Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Caruso, 252 Minn. 435, 90 N.W.2d 302 (1958).
3' See discussion in note 29 mtpra.
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A defendant's counsel, realizing his client is presently insolvent, may
feel that the simplest approach is to allow a default to be entered and then
have the judgment discharged in bankruptcy. This would not seem to
be a wise course in those cases where willful and malicious conduct or
facts from which such conduct could be inferred are alleged in the
complaint. In a personal injury case the proper result when no pleadings
are filed by defendant is default and inquiry since the damages are not
liquidated. 35 The effect of a judgment by default and inquiry is threefold: (1) It establishes a right of action of the kind properly pleaded
in the complaint. (2) It determines the right of the plaintiff to recover
at least nominal damages and costs. (3) It precludes the defendant
from offering any evidence in the inquiry to show that the plaintiff has
no right to action.30 Thus if the defendant fails to appear at the inquiry
the plaintiff will be free to put on evidence of willful and malicious conduct without fear of rebuttal and be confident of a favorable finding
on this issue. If the plaintiff follows this reasoning in the conduct of his
case the defendant's subsequent discharge will be of no avail against the
judgment. But on the other hand it is equally clear that the plaintiff cannot rely merely on the allegations of his complaint when the defendant
fails to appear or plead. To be safe the plaintiff must frame the issue
of willful and malicious conduct, put on evidence to support his contention and have the issue submitted for final determination.
In a Colorado case the complaint for damages allegedly suffered in
an automobile collision alleged that defendant's negligence consisted of
reckless or willful disregard of the rights of others. The trial court
heard evidence in support of such allegation and entered default judgment without specifically finding that more than simple negligence was
shown. The plaintiffs had execution on the judgment and the defendant
interposed his discharge as defense to the execution. The plaintiffs
contended that when defendant permitted default to enter against him
he admitted the truth of all facts properly alleged in the complaint and
that this created a non-dischargeable obligation. The court held the
judgment debt discharged and said:
If plaintiffs desired to protect themselves against the possibility
that defendant might seek a discharge in bankruptcy, it was incumbent on them to secure a specific finding in the trial court that
in bankthe negligence of defendant was such that a discharge
3
ruptcy would not operate to release the judgment. 7
"
30

GEN. STAT. § 1-212 (1953).
Howze v. McCall, 249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958).
Valdez v. Sams, 134 Colo. 488, 491, 307 P.2d 189, 190 (1957).

N.C.

added.)

(Emphasis
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An Ohio court a8 has gone so far as to look beyond the record, which
recited that it was the wrongful and intentional acts of defendant that
caused the injury, to the evidence offered at the time of judgment to
determine whether the action was actually based on wrongful acts or
whether it resulted from mere negligence. This court found that the
evidence supported mere negligence only and held the bankrupt discharged. This case seems to follow the modern trend of decisions that
a court is not concluded by allegations of the complaint and resort
may be had to the entire record to determine whether the action was
one for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of
another.39 Though the modern trend is toward this view there is still
a definite split of authority. 40 The California court expresses the contrary view as follows:
By permitting his default to be entered he [the defendant] confessed the truth of all the material allegations in the complaint
. . . including the allegations of wantoness, recklessness and
gross carelessness ....
A judgment by default is as conclusive
as to the issues tendered by the complaint as if it had been
rendered after answer filed and trial had on allegations denied
by the answer. . . . Such a judgment is res judicata as to all
issues aptly pleaded in the complaint and defendant is estopped
from denying in a subsequent action any allegations contained in
41
the former complaint.
In view of the foregoing it submitted that the best course for both
plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys to pursue in their attempt to secure
justice for their clients and prevent further litigation is simply to make
every effort in cases where willful and malicious injury could be involved to have the issue submitted to the jury. It is believed that if
this course is followed there will be no need for a defendant or a plaintiff to try the issue of whether a particular judgment is or is not discharged in bankruptcy when the judgment is sued on. The verdict and
judgment on this issue by the court trying the personal injury action
will put an end to litigation of dischargeability.

W. TRAvis PORTER
a Carroll v. Jones, 3 Ohio Op. 2d 221, 141 N.E.2d 239 (1956).

' Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1238 (1943).
Tharpe v. Breitowich, 323 Ill. App. 261, 55 N.E.2d 392

(1944) ; Reell ex rel.
Haskin v. Central Illinois Elec. & Gas Co., 317 Ill. App. 106, 45 N.E.2d 500
(1942).
" Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 127, 177 P.2d 364, 366 (1947).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Corporations-Settlement of Stockholders' Derivative ActionsRes Judicata
A stockholders' derivative suit was brought in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia subsequent to the commencement of
a similar action on the same issues by other stockholders in a New York
state court. The plaintiffs in both actions were minority shareholders
who were bringing suit on behalf of the corporation against the majority
shareholders. In both actions it was alleged that the majority shareholders had doninated the corporation causing it to purchase assets of
two other corporations at excessive prices. The federal court in Reiter
v. Universal Marion Corp.' granted the defendants' motion for a stay
of proceedings pending the outcome of the state action wherein a pro 7
posed settlement was before the New York court for approval. 2 The
plaintiffs were given leave to move to vacate the stay if the proceedings
in the New York court were not prosecuted with due diligence.
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power in every
court to control the disposition of cases on its docket to economize time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. 3 It is a well established rule, however, that the mere pendency of a state action involving
the same parties and the same subject matter does not as a matter of
right entitle the defendant to a stay of similar proceedings subsequent.ky
brought in a federal court.4 The determination of whether or not such
a stay should be granted is within the sound discretion of the trial court
judge.5 Exactly when the exercise of discretion in favor of granting
a stay is called for is not susceptible to any clear-cut lines of demarcation
as a matter of law. In certain situations involving stockholders' derivative actions, both state6 and federal 7 courts have granted stays which
1173 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1959).
2In an earlier case motion by defendants for a stay of proceeding in the federal
court pending the outcome of the New York action had been denied by the federal
district court, but the court here thought that there had been substantial change in
circumstances since that decision. The change in circumstances referred to included the facts that a hearing on the fairness of the compromise had been held
before a New York referee subsquent to the previous motion in the federal hearing,
and that an order from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denying
the prior motion had disavowed any implication in its ruling that the New York
stipulation of settlement did not cover the entire controversy.
'Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
'Amy v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 163 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1958), appeal
dismissed, 266 F.2d 869 (1959).
'Levy v. Alexander, 170 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Kanen Soap Prods.
Co. v. Struthers Wells Corp., 159 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Brendle v.
Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
'Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier,'308 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1957) ; Shanik v.
Aller, 52 N,Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Milvy v. Sperry Corp., 36 N.Y.S.2d 881
(Sup. Ct: 1939).
7 Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Schreiber v. Jacobs, 121
F. Supp. 6f0 (E.D. Mich. 1953); Dederick v. North American Co., 48 F. Supp.
410 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Ratner
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were dependent upon the disposition of another suit in a state or federal
court. In such a case the party applying for the stay must always
make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go
forward with the action.8 Generally, the objection to multiple actions
has been that they are very expensive and harassing for the defendant
who must fight his battle on several fronts. In cases where the stay
has been granted the following conditions were present: (1) the defendants in both actions were substantially identical, (2) the subject
matter of the suits was the same, and (3) the disposition of one suit
would finally determine all of the questions in the other action.
It becomes important, therefore, to examine the conditions in the
principal case which motivated the court to exercise its discretion in favor
of the proposed stay. In addition to the fact that the two actions sought
substantially the same relief on the same issues for the same corporation,
these conditions were: (1) all individual defendants against whom a
money judgment was sought were before the New York court, but the
federal court had not secured jurisdiction over the principal defendants,
(2) the New York action was brought first, hearing on the merits had
already been held, and the referee was about to render a report to the
court on the fairness of the proposed settlement, (3) settlement of the
stockholders' derivative suit in New York would not be accomplished
without first being approved by the New York Court. These factors
weighed heavily in favor of allowing the stay, especially since there
was a probability of a speedy determination of the New York action.
Also the plaintiffs appear to have advanced no valid argument that they
would be prejudiced or irreparably harmed if the stay were granted. The
principal case appears to have reached a desirable result in that it saves
expense to the litigants and avoids unnecessary consumption of time
in court without depriving shareholders of any substantial rights.
The language of the principal case intimated that if the proposed settlement had not been subject to approval in the state court, then the stay
would not have been granted. 9 The court stated, however, that an approved settlement of the state action would be res judicata to all other actions involving the same issues. Thus, the court indicates that it would
give the same effect to a court-approved settlement as it would to a final
judgment on the merits of the cause. In the absence of fraud or collusion of the parties, a judgment on the merits rendered by a court in a
stockholders' derivative action is res judicata against both the corporav. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Schwartz v.
Kaufman,
46 F. Supp. 318 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
8
Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (dictum).
173 F. Supp. at 15.
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tion and other stockholders in any subsequent suit on the same corporate
cause of action.10
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' and a New York Supreme
Court' 2 have held court-approved settlements in form of judgments to be

res judicata. Stella v. Kaiser'3 involved the effect on a subsequent case
of a settlement decree in a stockholders' derivative suit entered by a federal court. The Court of Appeals stated that a member of the class of
stockholders in a derivative suit is bound by and must accept a judicially
approved compromise in his behalf. 14 In a leading New York case,
Gerith Realty Corp. v. Norntandie Nat'l Sec. Corp.,15 a stockholders'
derivative action was brought on the same issues which had been compromised in open court before judgment in an earlier suit. The settlement was held to be binding on the corporation and on all persons having
the capacity to sue in the corporation's behalf whether or not they had
received notice of the settlement proposal.' 6
Under the New York rules of practice the court, as a matter of discretion, may require its approval of any settlement in a derivative action
which terminates the corporate right of action.' 7 The court also may
appoint a referee to inquire into the fairness of the compromise i8 or seek
the vote of the other stockholders. 19 Under Rule 23(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is mandatory that the settlement be submitted for court approval.2 0
Approval of the settlement is always discretionary, but the court
must consider all available facts and any objections of other stockholders. 21 Notice of the impending settlement 22 should be given to the

' 0 Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85 (2d Cir. 1916) ; Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp.
42 (N.D. Iowa 1946); Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Rys. & Union Stockyards
Co., 50 N.J. Eq. 656, 25 Atl. 281 (1892); 13 FLETCHER, Cyc. CORPS. § 6043 (perm.
ed. 1943) ; STEVENs, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 173 (1949).
Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954).
Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp., 276 N.Y. Supp. 655
' Gerith Realty
(Sup. Ct. 1933).
1 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954).
" Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954). However, in this case, the
plaintiff had been a participant in the first action. In a strong dictum the court
stated that even without plaintiff's participation in the prior action, he would be
bound by the previous action because it was a conclusive adjudication of a trueclass action.
"276 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 717, 269 N.Y.
Supp. 1007 (1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 525, 195 N.E. 183 (1935).
" Ibid.

" N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 8; Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp.,
215 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
18 Breswick v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397
" Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie Nat'l Sec. Corp., 276 N.Y. Supp. 655
(Sup. Ct 1933) ; BALLENTINE, CoR'oRAmioxs § 155 (1946).
2
Robbins v. Sperry Corp., 1 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). The court so ruled
even as to a dismissal of some of the defendants, with the action still pending as to
others.
2324 (1948).
MOORE, FmERAL PRAcnicE
22
Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 47 COLUm. L.
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shareholders in every case because the right or duty involved belongs to
them, and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure notice must be
given in compromise settlements of all true class actions. 24 In New York
the court apparently has the discretion as to whether or not notice is to be
given to other stockholders before the settlement is approved. 2
Under both New York and federal decisions the proceeds of a derivative action belong to the corporation ;2 6 certainly such proceeds should
not be retained to the plaintiff's individual use, as opposed to the
corporation's use, whether realized by judgment, court-approved settlement, or private settlement.
In New York the courts have recognized the power in the plaintiff
to discontinue or privately settle his suit at any time before judgment
or before intervention by another stockholder. 27 Other shareholders,
however, may intervene at will and divest the original plaintiff of his
dominion over the suit.28 Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure private settlements of stockholders' derivative suits are not
allowed in federal controversies. Eleven states have adopted rules similar to Rule 23 ;29 however, North Carolina has not done so.
REv. 1, 21 (1947).

"The notice . . . usually advises the stockholder: that one or
more derivative suits are pending on behalf of his corporation; that a settlement
has been proposed and that a copy of the settlement offer is annexed; that the court
has set a date for a hearing to determine whether the offer should be accepted;
that the court has directed that all stockholders of record be given notice by mail
and ordered to show cause at such hearing why the settlement should not be accepted and approved by the court as fair and reasonable; that the pleadings, examinations before trial, minutes of the trial to date, and all papers in the litigation
may be examined at the office of the county clerk or at the offices of the general
counsel for the plaintiffs.
Annexed to the notice is usually a complete copy of the offer addressed to the
corporation and plaintiff's counsel. The offer states what the defendants are willing
to pay or do in exchange for a termination of the suit and for releases to
them . . . "
2 See note 22 supra.
24 FED. R. Crv. P. 73. "Rule 23(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
classifies the shareholders' derivative suit as a species of 'true' class suit which
is defined to be an action where the interest of the members of a class is joint,
common, or secondary (derivative) and where the members are so numerous that
it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court . . . ." LATrN &
JENNINGS,
CASES & MATE.RIALS ON CoRoRAIoNs 738 (1959).
22
N.Y.R. Civ. PRac. 8.
2Klein v. Klein's Outlet, Inc., 160 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1947); Clark v. Greenberg,2 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
" Manufacturer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson, 25 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct.
1940); Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y.
Supp.8 360 (1934) ; Brinkerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N.Y. 185, 1 N.E. 663 (1885).
Manufacturer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson, supra note 27 (dictum); 13
FLETCHER, Cyc. CORPS. § 6001 (perm. ed. 1943).
29
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN., R. Civ. PRoc., Rule 23(c) (1956); DEL. CODE ANN.,
RULES OF CoURT OF CHANCERY, Rule 23(c) (1953) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1
(Smith-Hurd 1956) ; IowA CODE ANN., R. Crv. PRoc., Rule 45 (1951) ; Ky. RFv.
STAT., R. CIrv. PROc., Rule 23.02 (1959); NEv. REv. STAT., R. Civ. PRoc., Rule
23(c) (1959) ; N.M. STAT. § 21-1-1, Rule 23(c) (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
R. CIV. PRoc. 2230(b) (1951); TEx. R. CIV. Psoc., Rule 42(b) (1954); UTAH
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In jurisdictions that allow private settlements, "whereby individual
plaintiffs settle out of court, such settlements are not res judicata as to
other stockholders. A voluntary discontinuance of a derivative action in
this manner would not bar a subsequent suit by other stockholders;
however, once a derivative suit is voluntarily discontinued, the same
suit may not be revived by a motion in the cause.30 This rule against
revival was applied in Manufacturer'sMut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hopson,31
where the New York court refused to reopen a stockholders' suit which
had been privately settled by purchase of the complainant's stock at
seven times the market value with funds of the corporation on whose
behalf the suit had been brought. Although the court stated that the
termination under these circumstances would not bar a new suit by the
corporation, in such a case it may be that the statute of limitations has
32
run.
Settlements, as a compromise to litigation, are generally encouraged
in order to reduce the administrative burdens and expense to the courts
and litigants. The requirement of court approval brings a proposed
settlement out in the open where its fairness may be compared with
the results that might be secured should the case proceed to trial. Generally court approval of these settlements is given by way of a final
decree or judgment;33 however, the effect of an approved settlement
when not rendered in this official form, e.g., the mere notation of the
court's approval upon the record, is uncertain. A recommended method
of clearly resolving questions of law in this area is the enactment of
legislation similar to federal rule 23 but broader in scope. Such legislation should prohibit discontinuance, settlement, or compromise without
court approval, and provide for the finality of court approved settlements,
as well as specify the form in which such approval is to be rendered.
ROBERT N. RANDALL

Covenants Not To Compete
Covenants not to compete are most commonly found in contracts for
the sale of a business or in contracts of employment and have as their
CODE ANN., R. Civ. PROC., Rule 23(c) (1953); Wyo. STAT., R. Civ. PRoc., Rule
23(c) (1959).
'0See generally STEVENS, PRIVATE COR'ORATIONS § 173 (1949).
3125 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 731, 29 N.Y.S.2d
139 (1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 688, 43 N.E.2d 71 (1942).
"Ibid.; Hornstein, Problems of Procedure it Stockholder's Derivative Suits,
42 CoLum. L. REv. 574, 583 (1942).
"Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954); Gerith Realty Corp. v.
Normandie Nat'l See. Corp., 215 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Reiter v. Universal Marion Corp., 173 F. Supp. 13, 15 (1959) (dictum).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

object protection of the convenantee.' It is the purpose of this Note to
examine the limitations on the validity of such covenants and to consider
what constitutes a breach or interference with rights thereunder.
In addition to the requirements that such covenants be supported
by consideration2 and be in writing,8 our court seems to look only at
the reasonableness 4 of the provisions in determining their validity. The
court in almost every instance when it sets forth the factors it will consider in determining the reasonableness of a covenant includes the time
period as a vital factor. Yet the fact is that in no decision has a covenant
been found to be unreasonable because of too extensive a duration. Of
the eight cases found where the covenant was not upheld, always for
other reasons, the limitation on the duration of the covenants was a certain number of months,5 two years, 6 three years, 7 five' years,8 or ten
years, 9 and in three cases no time period was specified. 10 A similar
range in the length of time the covenants were to last may be found in
those cases where the covenants have been upheld." In cases where the
restriction was either "as long as the covenantee lives" or "as long as the
covenantee continues in business" the court indicated it would interpret
the length of time of the covenant to be co-extensive with the covI "There are several reasons for the growing popularity of such covenants: 1.
The raiding of employee talent by some employers. 2. The increasing business need
to develop technical innovations and keep them secret. 3. Increased spending for

and development." Nation's Business, Oct. 1959, p. 14.
research
2
Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944) ; Teague v. Schaub, 133
N.C. 467, 45 S.E. 765 (1903) ; see generally 17 C.J.S. Comztracts § 260 (1939); 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1636 (1937).
3
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (1950); Radio Electronics Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 244 N.C. 114, 92 S.E.2d 664 (1956) ; Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk
& Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 910 (1935)
'Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670, 9 S.E.2d 473 (1939) ; Cowan v. Fairbrother,
118 N.C. 406, 24 S.E. 813 (1896) ; 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 240 (1939) ;5 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1636 (1937).
Culp v. Love, 127 N.C. 457, 37 S.E. 476 (1900).
'Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944).
'Comfort Springs v. Burroughs, 217 N.C. 658, 9 S.E.2d 473 (1939).
"Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947).
' Shute v. Shute, 176 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (1918).
" Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 317, 77
S.E.2d 910 (1953) ; Teague v. Schaub, 133 N.C. 468, 45 S.E. 762 (1903) ; Shute v.
Heath, 131 N.C. 281, 42 S.E 704 (1902).
Time Period (years)
"Covenant Upheld (cases)
No time period.
6 .............................................
Lives of the parties.
2 .............................................
2 .............. ............. .................. 1
4.............................................
4 .................... .......................

2
3

2 ............................................. 5
10
.........
......................
2 .............
1 ................. ........................... 15

1 ........................................

20
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enantor's life span.12

In Shute v. Heath'8 no time limitation was set
out in the contract and the court said, "An indefinite restriction as to
14
duration will not make such contracts void."'
As to a second area of reasonableness, the territorial extent of the
restriction, there is a precedent question. Our court has said, "[T]here
must be a definite limitation as to space; and the reasonableness of such
limitation will depend upon the nature of the business and goodwill
sold."' 5 This raises the questions what standard will be applied to determine if the limitation is definite enough and, if sufficiently definite,
when is the criterion of reasonableness met.
In Shute v. Heath there was a contract for the sale of a manufacturing business which included a restrictive covenant containing a limitation as to "any territory now occupied by them [covenantees] or from
which they [covenantees] secure their patronage." The court held that
this was not a sufficient limitation on the area. The court reasoned that
where the covenantor could not secure patronage in the future is not
something that could be determined at the time the contract was entered
into. It should be noted that the decision rested not on the unreasonableness of the limitation, but on its indefiniteness.
The standard of measurement that has been applied by the court to
determine if the territorial limitation is sufficiently definite is whether
the rules that apply to the description of real estate in deeds have been
satisfied.1 However, the court seems to use two means other than the
actual words of the contract to decide what actually is the extent of the
limitation-namely, implied restrictions and restrictions established by
parol testimony. In Hauser v. Harding'7 the restricting words in the
contract were "the territory surrounding Yadkinville." Though the
territory outside the town could not be identified, the town limits could
be and the court held the contract was not uncertain to this extent and
should be interpreted by implication to mean "within the town limits of
Yadldnville."'I s In Teague z. Schaub'9 the limitation, "If the field [of
2 This raises a problem as to what the court would decide if the covenantee
either died befQre the covenantor or went out of business. It seems unlikely that
the covenantor would be bound for life in either situation. It is submitted that the
court would probably find that the covenantor would be bound for life, if either of
these two events did not transpire during the covenantor's life span.
131 N.C. 281, 42 S.E. 704 (1902).
U Id. at 282, 42 S.E. at 704.
15
Id. at 282, 42 S.E. at 704.
"6 Shute v. Heath, 131 N.C. 281, 42 S.E. 704 (1902) ; Hauser v. Harding, 126
N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (1900). But see 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 256 (1939), stating
that by the majority view the criterion is that the contract must be sufficiently
specific
17 to allow a determination of its reasonableness.
Supra note 16.
a See also Wooten v. Harris, 153 N.C. 43, 68 S.E. 898 (1910), where the court,
expressly following Hauser, said that the territorial limitation "in the town of
Falkland or near enough thereto to interfere with the plaintiff's business," though
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a *medical practice] is not larger then than now," was too indefinite and
thie court refused to imply a restriction. The court reasoned'that this
limitation could relate to receipts from the practice, the number of
patients, or the extent of the territory.20
The court in a recent case2 ' allowed parol testimony to determine
the territorial limits of the restriction "in Lenoir or the territory now
c6vered by him [covenantor]," finding it to cover ten counties. The
court looked to what territory came within the confines of the restrictive
covenant at the time the covenant was made, not at the time of the
litigation. The covenant specified the territory "now covered" by the
Vendor's business and the court found this was not void for indefiniteness of description because the territory could be specifically located by
parol evidence.
Once the territory is found definite enough, the proper conclusion
would seem to be that the primary consideration of the court in determining whether there is a reasonable restraint on territory is whether
the territory is greater than that required to protect the covenantee's
business.22 In Noe v. McDevitt23 the covenant included North and
South Carolina, but the covenantee's business only covered eastern
North Carolina. The court held that the covenant covered too extensive
a territory to be a reasonable protection of the covenantee's business and
was thus void as against public policy. It has been suggested that
a more appropriate remedy could have been reached in
the Noe case
if the court had enforced the contract only as far as the actual needs of
North Carolina instead of
the covenantee's business extended in eastern
24
declaring the whole contract of no effect
The third area in which the test of reasonableness must be met concerns the hardship that may be imposed on the covenantor. Although
the court does not seem to pay particular attention to this factor in
contracts other than contracts of employment, it appears that employment
contracts will be carefully scrutinized to ascertain whether there is any
undue oppression resulting to the covenantor-employee. 25 It should be
indefinite as to any place outside the city, was definite enough if limited to the city

limits.
'p133 N.C. 458, 45 S.E. 762 (1903).
The dissent reasoned that "field" should mean "Roxboro and the adjacent
area" and that the Hauser case should control, so that this should be interpreted to
mean the city limits of Roxboro. The dissent also favored the admission of parol
testimony to determine the extent of the restraint.
"Thompson v. Turner, 245 N.C. 478, 96 S.E.2d 263 (1957).
See Thompson v. Turner, mipra note 21.
28228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947).
"See Note, 26 N.C.L. Rzv. 402 (1948).
""[T]he English and American courts make a substantial distinction between
the two in administrative practice .... The distinction rests on a substantial basis,
since, in the former class of contracts we deal with the sale of commodities, and in
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noted that when this issue is to be determined the burden of proof is on
the covenantee-employer to establish its reasonableness. 26
There is a difference between the standard of reasonableness applied
to a restrictive covenant in the case of a person in a professional or
executive type job and that applied in the case of an employee. 27 The
reason for the difference is that an employee only has his labor to sell.
If in urgent need of selling he will more probably accede to an unreasonable restriction at the time of his employment without proper thought for
the future than will a person in a professional or executive type job who
is in a better position to guard his own interests and is more capable of
comprehending the after-effects. Consequently, the court seems to
scrutinize less carefully the professional or executive contracts than
common employment contracts in determining whether any undue hardship is placed on the covenantor.
The final factor in determining the reasonableness of a restrictive
covenant is whether the dominant intent of the parties was, in effect, to
oppress the public. In Shute v. Shute28 the court held the covenant
invalid because there was no intent to protect good will, but only an
attempt to divide the territory in order to keep out all competitors, an
object which was said to be against the interests of the public. 9 It
should be noted that as the court seems to have decided that the attempt
to divide the area was present on the face of the contract, it speaks in
terms of the intent present at the time the contract was made as opposed
the latter class with the performance of personal service-altogether different in

substance; and the social and economic imlications are vastly different. . . . Contracts restraining employment are looked upon with disfavor in modern law ....
And they have been held to be prima fade void... [T]he argument against restraint of employment was-and still is-more powerful than those based on the
evils of monopoly incident to restriction in sales contracts." Kadis v. Britt, 224
N.C. 154, 160, 29 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1944). See generally 5 W.LrmIsToN, CONTRACrS
§ 1643 (1937) ; RESTATEUMNT, CoNTcrs § 515, comment b (1932) ; 43 A.L.R.2d

111 (1935).
20 Kadis v. Britt, supra note 25.
27

Sonotone Co. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1947)

(contract be-

tween a district manager and a corporation); Beam v. Rutledge, 217 N.C. 670,
9 S.E.2d 473 (1939)

(contract between two physicians).

176 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (1918). But see Culp v. Love, 127 N.C. 457, 462,
37 S.E. 476, 478 (1900), where the court said: "The intention of the parties [to the
contract] is immaterial." This statement on its face is in conflict with the statement
made by the court in Shute v. Shiite. The intention referred to in the Culp case
was a subjective belief of the parties as to the legal effect of the contract. This
belief is not controlling. The intention referred to in Shiite v. Shiite was the
dominant purpose of the contract. This purpose or object is controlling. Both
cases held that if the object of a contract is found primarily to shut off all competition, not incidentally to do so, then the contract is against -public policy and of no
effect.
2' The court has said it will allow a contract to remain valid, though in part
designed to stifle competition. The covenant must not be solely for that purpose.
Faust v. Rohr, 166 N.C. 187, 81 S.E. 1096 (1914). See generally RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 518 (1932) ; 5 WrLLisToN, CoNTRAcrs § 1648 (1937).
28
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to that at the time of litigation. The court has indicated that it is not
necessary that the effect be a division of land which causes all competitors to keep out as lorig as this is the present intent.
In looking to the intent of a restritive covenant, the court has two
basic considerations, the needs of the public and the nature of the business. In Shute v. Shute the court found the object of the contract was
to divide the territory between the covenantor and the covenantee in
putting up ginning plants. The court said there should be a multiplication of plants according to the needs of the public, and that the public
would be burdened if a competing ginning mill was too distant to make
patronizing it economically feasible; consequently, the number of gins
to be erected should not be restricted by an agreement between the
parties in that line of business8 0 In Morehead Sea Food Co. v. Way &
Co., 1 where the covenantor sold his business to a corporation composed
of all the major buyers of fish in a particular area, the court said there
was nothing on the face of the contract showing an intent to prevent
others from engaging in the same business. The court noted the fact
that there were more competitors at the time of the suit than at the time
the contract was made and that the public was getting the benefit from
the ensuing competition.32 In Cowan v. Fairbrother8 the court upheld
an agreement not to publish a competing newspaper in North Carolina.
This seems to have been justified on the ground that "in its very nature
this [agreement] could not seriously affect the public, because there is
free opportunity to establish newspapers, which are largely the product
8' 4
of the individual ability of the editors.
In addition to the discussion of the primary question of what factors
are considered by the court in determining the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant, it is appropriate to consider how or when the question arises. The question usually arises when the covenantee finds the
covenantor, either alone or in association with a third party, competing
with him in spite of the covenant.
8o See generally Breckenridge, Restraint of Trade it North Carolina, 7 N.C.L.
R v. 249 (1929).
"169 N.C. 679, 86 S.E. 603 (1915).
"The dissent reasoned the contract on its face was designed to monopolize the
entire market. The basic question for the dissent was whether it is possible to
injure the public, not whether the public is actually being injured. See also Wooten
v. Harris, 153 N.C. 43, 68 S.E. 898 (1910), where the court said an agreement
might be invalid "if it were shown that this was one of many similar contracts
tending to engross or monopolize any given business, or the sale of any article,
within the territory named." Id. at 46, 68 S.E. at 899.

"118

N.C. 406, 24 S.E. 813 (1896).

,Morehead Sea Food Co. v. Way & Co., 169 N.C. 679, 688, 86 S.E. 603, 607

(1915).,
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In Reeves v. Sprague,85 where the action was against a third party
and the covenantor, the third party had bought the inventory of the
covenantor, giving a purchase money mortgage to secure the payment
of the purchase price. The court held it "would not restrain the covenantor from selling of leasing his premises to others to engage in the
business which he has agreed to abstain from carrying on or from selling
to them machinery or supplies needed in embarking in it."' 6 The holding of a mortgage by the covenantor was not deemed a sufficient interest
to violate the covenant. The court seemed to look at whether the covenantor had divested himself of all interest in the subject matter of the
covenant, and, if not, to how to direct his interest and control were in
the competing activities of the third party. The court seemed to look
at the third party to see whether his activities evidenced an alliance with
the covenantor to avoid the effect of the covenant or whether the third
party had intentionally induced the covenantor to breach the covenant.
In Kramer v. Old, 7 where the action was against the covenantor,
the court held "[A] different rule [from that in the Reeves case] must
prevail when it appears that the prohibited party attempts, not to sell
outright to others, but to furnish the machinery or capital, or a portion
of either... in a corporation organized with a view to competition with
the person protected by his contract against such injury."38 In Finch v.
Michael39 the covenantor loaned money to the third party who competed
directly with the covenantee, but the court held the covenantor did not
have sufficient interest in the third party's business to violate his contract with the covenantee. The holding in the Finch case as to the furnishing of capital seems to disregard the language of the court in the
Kramer case forbidding it. However, in Finch the court seems to be
looking at the actual effect of the furnishing of capital to the third party
and not at the motive of the covenantor. The court in Finch seemed to
admit there was a breach of the covenant, but it did not feel there was
a substantial breach present. The court admitted that the covenantor
"might not be acting with due propriety nor with good faith" but it
40
could not see how he had committed any legal wrong.
' 114 N.C. 647, 19 S.E. 707 (1894).

'Finch v. Michael, 167 N.C. 322, 324, 83 S.E. 459, 460 (1914).
'1119
N.C. 1, 25 S.E. 813 (1896).,
8
" Id. at 12, 25 S.E. at 815; cf. King v. Fountain, 126 N.C. 196, 35 S.E. 428
(1900), where the covenanator got his wife to set up a business in' competition
with the covenantee and the court said: "[I]t requires but little scrutiny to look
through these facts and discover who controls the business and enjoys the profits."
3"167 N.C. 322, 83 S.E. 458 (1914).
'oId. at 325, 83 S.E. at 460. But see Baker v. Cordon, 86 N.C. 119 (1882),
where the court said the covenantor had to maintain his "personal separation" from
the business the covenantee was engaged in and could not be "instrumental in inducing others to embark in it." See also Kramer v. Old, 119 N.C. 1, 25 S.E. 813
(1913).
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In Sineath v. Katzis ' the vendor corporation sold all its assets to
the covenantee. The covenantor was president of the vendor corporation and owned ninety-eight percent of its stock. The court said that
the covenantor did not need to have a direct interest in the business sold
to be subject to a validly binding restrictive covenant; he needs only to
be prominent in the business sold. 42 The court seemed to feel that this
would satisfy the requirement that the covenant be incidental to or in
support of another lawful contract, a requirement necessary because the
covenantor must receive a valuable consideration in return for his agreeing to the restraint. The court uses language to the effect that if the
parties intended that the covenant should be incidental to the main transaction,43 though there was no express agreement present, this would be
-satisfactory.
As stated in Sineath, the general rule is that a third party cannot
be enjoined from engaging in the business covered by the covenant or
be otherwise held liable except when he, knowing of the covenant, aids
the covenantor in violating his covenant or receives some benefit from
the violation. In Sineath, after the vendor corporation had sold to the
vendees all its real and personal property, the third party organized a
corporation which competed with the covenantees. The covenantor participated indirectly in its management and in the profits the new corporation made. As a consequence, the court found that the third party as
well as the covenantor had participated in a breach of the contract.
In Sineath the court seems to take the position that the corporation
is not to be enjoined from competing with the covenantee, though the
corporation was organized and supported by the covenantor, unless the
corporation is found to be the alter ego44 of the covenantor. The court
mentioned the fact that the covenantees failed to show who the stockholders were or what interest any particular party had in the new corpo"218 N.C. 740, 12 S.E.2d 611 (1940).
In order to hold an outsider liable for compensatory damages for causing a

42

breach of contract, the following elements are required: (1) that there existed
a valid contract between the third party and the plaintiff; (2) that the outsider
had knowledge of the existence of such a contract; (3) that the outsider intentionally induced the third party not to perform his contract; (4) that the outsider

acted without justification; and (5) that the outsider's action caused the plaintiff
actual damage. The outsider has knowledge of the contract if he knows the facts
which give rise to the plaintiff's contractual right against the third party. He is

subject to liability even though mistaken as to the legal sufficiency of the contract
and the significance thereof and believes there is no contract or that the contract
means something other than what it is judicially held to mean. If the outsider acts
without a sufficient lawful reason then he has acted without justification. Childress
v. Abeles, 240 N.C. 667, 84 S.E.2d 176 (1954).
" Sineath v. Katzis, 218 N.C. 755, 12 S.E2d 611 (1940). See also 17 C.J.S.
Contracts § 246 (1939).
"See

(1936).

generally LATrY, S-BSIDIAPIES AND AFFILIATED CoRpoRATIONS 64-65
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ration. For this reason the court seemed to feel that the new corporation
had not been brought within the exception to the general rule.
In summary, the court thus far in its decisions does not seem to give
any substantial weight to the duration of the covenant. However, the
covenantee would seem well advised to avoid a covenant that lasts forever, and to limit the covenant to the lives of the parties involved, since
the court has used language in its decisions which would give it an adequate peg on which to hang any future finding of unreasonable duration.
In respect to the extent of the territory the covenant is to include,
any restriction on the covenantor which is all-encompassing should be
avoided. The covenantee, of course, will want to draw up a contract
that will include the territory presently covered by the covenantee's
business and, at the same time, will include the territory the covenantee
will reasonably need protected in the future. Perhaps one means to
accomplish this is to separate the territory into various segments so that
the court, if it feels the outer limits are unreasonable, can easily enforce
the covenant as to a portion without destroying the entire contract.
The covenantee will have no guide as to whether the contract will be
in violaton of public policy. To say the court looks to the nature of the
business and the needs of the public is nebulous and of little help outside
fact situations like those ruled on in prior cases. Thus, the matter is
largely one of prediction. As a further difficulty, the court does not
always make clear in its decisions whether it looks at the reasonableness
of the covenant at the time the contract was made or at the time the contract is being litigated. Finally, it should be noted that the court does
not seem to consider any one factor of reasonableness alone in arriving
at its decisions.
W. TEOMAs RAY
Landlord and Tenant-Liability of Landlord for Personal
Injuries Caused by His Failure To Repair
In a recent case from the Third Circuit," plaintiff, a social guest in
the home of a tenant, was injured as she left the premises. She sued
the landlord, alleging that, in performing his covenant to make repairs,
he negligently installed a light fixture and that as a consequence of this
improper installation she was injured. The district court gave summary
judgment for the defendant. The circuit court reversed, saying that
under New Jersey law, when the landlord undertakes to make repairs,
he is bound to perform the work in a reasonably careful manner, and for
failure to do so he will be liable in tort to one injured because of his
negligence.
'Krieger

v. Ownership Corp., 270 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 199).
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-The question of liability of the landlord for personal injuries resulting
from the disrepair of the demised premises may arise in any of three situations: (1) where, in the absence of a covenant to repair, he does not
repair and one is injured; (2) where he fails to perform a covenant to
repair and one is injured; (3) where, with or without a covenant to repair, he undertakes to make repairs but does the work negligently and
one is injured. -Further, in each of these situations, a question arises as
to the landlord's liability to different classes of people-for example,
2
tenants, guests of tenants, business visitors and strangers.

Where There Is No Covenant To Repair
American courts with few exceptions continue to adhere to the common law rule that where there is no covenant to repair the landlord
is under no duty to do so; therefore, they conclude that he is not liable
for personal injuries sustained by the tenant or his guests because of
the disrepair of the premises.3 The majority reasons that the duty to
repair is an incident of control; and since the tenant has control of the
premises-'including the right to admit or exclude visitors-he has the
duty to repair. 4 Since the rights of the tenant's guests are ordinarily
the same as those of the tenant, those jurisdictions following the majority
view deny the guest recovery. 5 North Carolina appears to be firmly in
accord with the majority. 6
'This note will be limited to the question of liability of the landlord to the
tenant and to the tenant's social guests. The writer will not attempt to deal
with such things as the so-called "business visitor" rule which governs liability
for injury to an innocent third party who is on the premises at the invitation of
the tenant where, at the time of making a lease for a public or semi-public purpose,
conditions exist on the premises making them unfit for their intended purpose. As
to the "business visitor" rule see Webel v. Yale Univ., 125 Conn. 515, 7 A.2d 215
(1939) ; Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 551, 4 N.W.2d 617 (1942) ; Reese
v. Piedmont, Inc., 240 N.C. 391, 82 S.E.2d 365 (1954) ; Prosser, Business Visitors
and Invitees, 26 MiNN. L. REv. 573 (1942).
8
Uhlig v. Moore, 265 Ala. 646, 93 So. 2d 490 (1957); Penna v. Stewart, 78
Ariz. 272, 278 P.2d 892 (1955) ; Farber v. Greenberg, 98 Cal. App. 675, 277 Pac.
534 (1929); Newman v. Golden, 108 Conn. 676, 144 Atl. 467 (1929); Clerken
v. Cohen, 315 Ill. App. 222, 42 N.E.2d 846 (1942) ; Richmond v. Standard Elkhorn Coal Co., 222 Ky. 150, 300 S.W. 359 (1927) ; Bushman v. Bushman, 311 Mo.
551, 279 S.W. 122 (1925); Goodall v. Deters, 121 Ohio St. 432, 169 N.E. 443
(1929); Oliver v. Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 (1951); PRossER, ToRTs
§ 80 (2d ed. 1955) ; 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (1947) ; RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs §§ 355, 356 (1934).
' Penna v. Stewart, 78 Ariz. 272, 278 P.2d 892 (1955) ; Brooks v. Peters, 157
Fla. 141, 25 So. 2d 205 (1946); Oliver v. Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571
(1951).
5
Uhlig v. Moore, 265 Ala. 646, 93 So. 2d 490 (1957); Rendall v. Pioneer
Hotel, Inc., 71 Ariz. 10, 222 P.2d 986 (1950); Clerken v. Cohen, 315 Ill. App.
222, 42 N.E.2d 846 (1942) ; Mahnken v. Gillespie, 329 Mo. 51, 43 S.W.2d 797
(1931); Corcione v. Ruggiere, 139 A.2d 388 (R.I. 1958); Oliver v. Cashin, 192
Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 (1951); RESTATEMENT, ToRTS §§ 355, 356 (1934); 52
C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 418 (1947).
Robinson v. Thomas, 244 N.C. 732, 94 S.E.2d 911 (1956) ; Harril v. Sinclair
Ref Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E.2d 240 (1945); Mercer v. Williams, 210 N.C. 456,
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This view, however, has not gone without criticism. Several writers
have felt a need for protecting the large and ever-increasing "tenant" segment of our population by placing on the landlord a duty to repair. 7 Several factors have led to this view, among them the following: greater
mobility of population resulting in greater use of the short-term lease,
changes in construction principles necessitating larger financial outlays
for repairs, and increased urbanization causing concentration of people
in one dwelling. 8 The duty to repair has been placed on the landlord primarily through legislation. Such legislation has tended to fall
into three basic classes: (1) statutes requiing the landlord to repair and imposing a penalty for his failure to do so ;9 (2) statutes requiring the landlord to repair and providing that if he fails to do so the
tenant may deduct the cost of repairs from the rent or terminate the contract;i1 (3) statutes requiring the landlord to repair and imposing tort
liability for personal injuries arising because of his failure to do so." The
courts are not in agreement as to whether statutes of classes (1) and (2)
place tort liability on the non-repairing landlord. Thus, of the jurisdictions having a class (1) type statute, some hold that the common law
has been abrogated by the statute and that the landlord is liable for
negligent failure to repair,.2 while others hold that, even though the landlord has the duty to repair, he is not liable for personal injury.' 3 Those
jurisdictions having a class (2) type statute uniformly hold that the
landlord is not liable for personal injuries arising from violation of his
statutory duty.' 4 Of course, in those jurisdictions having a class (3)
type statute the courts hold that the landlord is subject to liability for
187 S.E. 556 (1936); Williams v. Strauss, 210 N.C. 200, 185 S.E. 676 (1936);
Salter v. Gordon, 200 N.C. 381, 157 S.E. 11 (1931); Hudson v. Singleton Silk
Co., 185 N.C. 342, 117 S.E. 165 (1923); Fields v. Ogburn, 178 N.C. 407, 100 S.E.
583 (1919).
Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958) ; 1 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78 (Casner ed. 1952); Comments, 41 GEo. L.J. 115
(1952),
62 HAv. L. REv. 669 (1949).
8
Ibid.

GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 19-343, -344 (1958) ; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 413.66,
ANN. LAWS ch. 144 §§ 66, 89 (1957); MicH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5.2843, .2873 (1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:7-1, :11-3 (1940); N.Y. MuLT.
DWELL. LAW § 78; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.06, .28 (1957).
0 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1941; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 42-201
(1947); N.D.
REv. CODE § 47-1612 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 32 (1954); S.D. CODE
'CONN.

.108 (1949); MAss.

§ 38.0409 (1939).
11GA.

CODE ANN. §§
STAT. §

(1952); LA. REv.

61-111, -112 (1937); LA. CIV.
9:3221 (1951).

CODE A NN.

art. 2693

" Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291, 205 N.W. 128 (1925); Michaels v. Brookchester,
Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958).
8 Chambers v. Lowe, 117
Conn. 624, 169 At. 912 (1933); Johnson v. Carter,
218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W. 864 (1934).
"Armstrong v. Zibell, 98 Cal. App. 2d 296, 219 P.2d 812 (1950); Dier v.
Mueller, 53 Mont. 288, 163 Pac. 466 (1917) ; Staples v. Baty, 206 Okla. 288, 242
P.2d 705 (1952).
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personal injuries arising from his failure to repair.15 It appears that a
few jurisdictions, without the aid of a statute, have imposed a duty on
the landlord to exercise due care in keeping the premises reasonably
safe and have held him liable for injuries resulting from the breach of
this duty. 16
Breach of Covenant To Repair
Most American writers say that the majority of Amercian jurisdic-tions hold, in accord with the common law rule, that where the landlord
covenants to repair but fails to do so he will not be held liable for personal injuries arising from such failure.' 7 Courts adhering to this view
hold that the landlord is not liable in tort or in contract.' 8 The reason
for denying recovery in tort is generally that the mere reservation of a
right to enter to make repairs does not in itself give the landlord the
degree of control necessary for imposing a legal duty.' The same courts
conclude that no contract liability for personal injuries arises because
such damages cannot be said to have been fairly within the contempla20
tion of the parties at the time that they entered into the contract.
Thus, the only cause of action is one arising in favor of the tenant for
breach of the contract with damages limited to the cost of repairs or the
depreciation in the value of the property. 2' Since the landlord is not
liable in tort or contract for personal injuries, it follows, and the courts
22
adhering to this view so hold, that those persons other than the tenant
"Kleinberg v. Lyons, 39 Ga. App. 774, 148 S.E. 535 (1929).
"Snyder v. I. Jay Realty Co., 53 N.J. Super. 336, 147 A.2d 572 (1958);
Skupienski v. Macy, 27 N.J. 240, 142 A.2d 220 (1958) ; see also Neilson v. Barclay
Corp., 255 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
172 HARPER & JAmES, TORTS § 27.16 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 80 (2d ed.
1955);
Note, 10 N.C.L. REv. 397 (1932).
8
Willis v. Snyder, 190 Iowa 248, 180 N.W. 290 (1920) ; Murrell v. Crawford,
102 Kan. 118, 169 Pac. 561 (1917) ; Huey v. Barton, 328 Mich. 584, 44 N.W.2d 132
(1950) ; Lahtinen v. Continental Bldg. Co., 339 Mo. 438, 97 S.W.2d 102 (1936) ;
Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931) ; Timmons v. Williams Wood
Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1931) ; Note, 10 N.C.L. REv. 397 (1932).
Cavalier v. Pope [1906] A.C. 428.
" Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931) ; Timmons v. Williams
Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 80 (2d
ed. 21955); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (1947).
Lahtinen v. Continental Bldg. Co., 339 Mo. 438, 97 S.W.2d 102 (1936);
Arnold v. Clark, 45 N.Y. Super. Ct. (13 Jones and S.) 252 (1879) ; Timmons v.
Williams Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932); 2 HARPER &
JAmES, TORTS § 27.16 (1956) ; 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (1947).
'I Murrell v. Crawford, 102 Kan. 118, 169 Pac. 561 (1917); Arnold v. Clark,
45 N.Y. Super. Ct. (13 Jones and S.) 252 (1879); Timmons v. Williams Wood
Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
§ 27.16 (1956); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (1947).
2'The scope of the term "tenant" is not readily ascertainable from the cases.
Strictly construed, "tenant" does not include members of the lessee's family, and
some cqurts so hold. Timmons v. Williams Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162
S.E. 329 (1932); Cavalier v. Pope, [1906] A.C. 428. Other courts have included
the family within the scope of the term. Kimmons v. Crawford, 92 Fla. 652,
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injured because of the disrepair are also precluded from recovery.2
North Carolina is in accord with this view. In Jordanv. Miller,24 where
the landlord breached a covenant to repair and an employee of the tenant
was injured because of the disrepair of the premises, the court said that
a tenant, his family, servants, or guests personally injured because of a
defect in the premises, existing because of the landlord's failure to comply
with his agreement to repair, may not recover indemnity from the landlord, since such damages are too remote and cannot be said to be fairly
25
within the contemplation of the parties.
It appears, however, that non-liability is by no means the prevailing
view in this country. On the contrary, an increasing number of jurisdictions have come to hold the landlord liable in tort or in contract for
personal injuries resulting from his breach of a covenant to repair.
Generally these courts hold the landlord liable in tort on the theory that
his duty to act is fixed by the contract. 2 However, even among th
courts which hold the landlord liable for personal injury on a torf
theory, there is no uniformity as to the requisites of such action. Thus,
some courts hold that in order for a duty to be imposed on the landlord
27
the contract must be such that he promises to keep the premises safe.
One court holds that the agreement must be one to make specific repairs
and must be supported by consideration. 28 It is usually held that in
109 So. 585 (1926); Fried v. Buhrmann, 128 Neb. 590, 259 N.W. 512 (1935).
As the text indicates, the distinction is of no practical consequence in this situation.
" Huey v. Barton, 328 Mich. 584, 44 N.W.2d 132 (1950) ; Timmons v. Williams
Wood Prod. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932); Cavalier v. Pope, [1906]
A.C. 428; PROSsFaR, TORTS § 80 (2d ed. 1955).
2,179
N.C. 73, 101 S.E. 550 (1919).
5
Accord, Moss v. Hicks, 240 N.C. 788, 83 S.E.2d 890 (1954) ; Leavitt v. Twin
County Rental Co., 222 N.C. 81, 21 S.E.2d 890 (1942) ; Tucker v. Park Yarn Mill
Co., 194 N.C. 756, 140 S.E. 744 (1927).
" Sanderson v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 245 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1957); Collision v. Curtner, 141 Ark. 122, 216 S.W. 1059 (1919) ; Singer v. Eastern Columbia,
Inc., 72 Cal. App. 2d 402, 164 P.2d 531 (1945); Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn.
398, 177 Atl. 262 (1935); Alaimo v. Du Pont, 4 Ill. App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583
(1954) (employee); Warebury v. Riss & Co., 169 Kan. 271, 219 P.2d 673 (1950)
(workman's compensation); Cornelio v. Viola, 161 So. 196 (La. App. 1935);
Patten v. Bartlett, 111 Me. 409, 89 AtI. 375 (1914) ; McKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md.
1, 113 A.2d 95 (1955); Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass. 249, 129 N.E. 443 (1921);
Keegan v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 129 Minn. 496, 152 N.W. 877 (1915);
Hodges v. Hilton, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935) ; Fried v. Burhmann, 128
Neb. 590, 259 N.W. 512 (1935) ; Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140
A.2d 199 (1958) ; Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, 180 Pac. 510 (1919) ; Merchant's Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916) ;
Pollack v. Perry, 217 S.W. 967 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), rev'd on other grounds,
235 S.W. 541 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921) ; Johnson v. Dye, 131 Wash. 637, 230 Pac.
625 (1924); Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914).
" Sanderson v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 245 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Alaimo
v. Du Pont, 4 Ill. App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583 (1954) ; Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass.
249, 129 N.E. 433 (1921) ; Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, 180 Pac. 510 (1919);
Lommori v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 63 N.M. 342, 319 P.2d 949 (1957) (dictum).
"8Hodges v. Hilton, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935).
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6rder for the landlord to be liable he must have notice of the disrepair
and have a reasonable time in which to correct it.29 On the other
hand, some courts hold that the landlord has a duty to make a reason-,
able inspection 80 The reason usually given for imposing tort liability
is 'that by a covenant to repair the landlord reserves control of the
premises for that purpose and that such reservation of control is sufficient
basis for imposing a legal duty to repair. 31 It is suggested that the
courts would be on firmer ground if they simply stated the policy reasons
for holding the landlord. 2 Indeed, most courts fail to mention either
control or policy, simply saying that the landlord's duty to act is fixed by
the contract, and, applying general negligence principles, hold him
liable 33 Thus, in a Connecticut case where the landlord breached his
covenant to repair and the tenant was injured because of the disrepair
qf the premises, the court held the landlord liable saying that the covenant
ipnposed a duty on him to exercise a certain degree of care to avoid
ipjury to others. The court stated that this duty arises where one is by
circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that anyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once know that if he
did not use ordinary care in regard to those circumstances danger of
injury to the other would result.3 4

These courts have had no difficulty

in extending the landlord's liability to the guests of the tenant,

5

though,

Alaimo v. Du Pont, 4 Ill.
App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583 (1954) ; McKenzie v.
Egge, 207 Md. 1, 113 A.2d 95 (1955); Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, 180 Pac.
510 (1919).
..8 Crowe v. BLxby, 237 Mass. 249, 129 N.E. 433 (1921); Glassman v. Martin,
196 Tenn. 595, 269 S.W.2d 908 (1954) ; Johnson v. Dye, 131 Wash. 637, 230 Pac.
625 (1924).
" Smith v. Housing Authority, 144 Conn. 13, 127 A.2d 45 (1956) ; Patten v.
Bartlett, 111 Me. 409, 89 Atl. 375 (1914) ; Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis.
626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914). The New York Court of Appeals has relaxed the rule
of a leading case, Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931), which
hld that a covenant to repair did not impose a legal duty on the landlord, to the
extent that a covenant to repair with reservation of the right to inspect the premises
gives sufficient control to the landlord to make him liable in tort. De Clara v.
Barber .S.S. Lines, Inc., 309 N.Y. 620, 132 N.E.2d 871 (1956), 23 BROOKLYN L.
Rxv. 142 (1957).
,
PRossER, ToRTs § 80 (2d ed. 1955), states that these courts indulge in a legal
fiction in saying that a covenant to repair gives the landlord control of the premises
since he does not have the right to admit and exclude visitors.
%32 See Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958), where
the court says that, while the common law principle of non-liability for failure to
repair was suitable for the agrarian setting in which it was conceived, to adhere
to it now is to lag behind changes in dwelling habits and economic realities.
Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 Atl. 262 (1935) ; Keegan v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 129 Minn. 496, 152 N.W. 877 (1915); Ashmun v. Nichols, 92
Ore. 223, 180 Pac. 510 (1919) ; Merchant's Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller,
135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916).
<- Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 Atl. 262 (1935).
Singer v. Eastern Columbia, Inc., 72 Cal. App. 2d 402, 164 P.2d 531 (1945);
Patten v. Bartlett, 11 Me. 409, 89 Atl. 375 (1914) ; Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass.
249, 129 N.E. 433 (1921); Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller,
135 Tenn. 187, 186 S.W. 87 (1916) (employee); Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158
Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914).
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since the duty is fixed by the contract, it would seem that an argument
could be made that his duty is limited to the tenant. 30
A few courts have refused to recognize a landlord's tort liability but
have held that he may be liable for personal injury in contract.37 However, the ordinary rules of contract damages are applied, i.e., the landlord
must have contemplated that personal injuries were likely to result from
the breach as a natural consequence thereof or must have been on notice
of such likelihood at the time the contract was made.3 8 Note that the only
difference in the reasoning of these courts and that of those which deny
recovery for personal injury in contract is that the latter refuse to
recognize that personal injuries may be foreseeable under the circumstances when the contract was made. It would seem arguable that,
since these courts apply the strict contract rules of damages, persons
other than the tenant who were injured would be barred by lack of
privity.3 9 However, such a holding should not absolve the landlord
entirely; if a third party is injured and such injury was foreseeable
at the time the contract was made, then, in the event that the tenant is
held liable to the third party in a suit for damages, the tenant's loss
should be held to have been foreseeable by the landlord and the landloid
should be held liable to the tenant in contract.
Where the Landlord Is Negligent in Making Repairs
The majority of American jurisdictions hold the landlord liable for
personal injuries to the tenant 4° or a third person 41 which are caused
by negligent repairs, whether performed gratuitously 42 or pursuant to a
" For an example of a court which has recognized the existence of this problem
see Colligan v. 680 Newark Ave. Realty Corp., 131 NJ.L. 520, 37 A.2d 206

(1944).

" Busick v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 91 N.H. 257, 18 A.2d 190 (1941). In
O'Neil v. Brown, 158 Ky. 118, 164 S.W. 315 (1914), the Kentucky court said in a
dictum that any action must be on the contract, and ordinarily personal injuries
are beyond the contemplation of the parties; however, under Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Exch. Rep. 941, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), if notice is given, the boundaries of

natural
consequence may be enlarged.
8
Busick v. Home Owners Loan Corp., supra note 37; O'Neil v. Brown, supra
note3 37.
But see Busick v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 91 N.H. 257, 18 A.2d 190
(1941), holding the landlord liable in contract to the tenant's wife.

Quaere:

whether the court considered the tenant's family within the scope of the term

"tenant." See the discussion of the conflict of reasoning as to scope of the term
"tenant" at note 22 supra. At any rate, it seems that the tenant's family could be
considered third party beneficiaries more readily than could a social guest.

"'Nelson v. Myers, 94 Cal. App. 66, 270 Pac. 719 (1928); Lasky v. Rudman,
337 Mo. 555, 85 S.W.2d 501 (1935) ; Verplanck v. Morgan, 90 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio
%,pp.1948).

"'Kimmons v. Crawford, 92 Fla. 652, 109 So. 585 (1926) ; Barman v. Spencer,
49 N.E. 9 (Ind. 1898). Barrod v. Liedoff, 95 Minn. 474, 104 N.W. 289 (1905) ;
Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn*. 524, 45 S.W. 781 (1898).
"'Roesler v. Liberty Natl Bank, 2 Ill. App. 2d 54, 118 N.E.2d 621 (1954);

Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 110 A.2d 683 (1955) ; Lasky v. Rudman, 337 Mo.
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covenant to repair.4 3 There are, however, differences in the reasoning
of the courts on this matter. North Carolina appears to be in accord
with the majority in holding the landlord for simple misfeasance once
he undertakes to repair pursuant to a covenant,44 though there is some
question whether there can be a recovery where the repairs are gratuitous. 45 In Hill v. Day,48 where the landlord negligently repaired and a
sub-lessee, who had no knowledge of the repairs, was injured, the Maine
court held that before one can recover for injuries resulting from negligent performance of a gratuitous undertaking he must prove reliance
on a condition of safety which he believed was created by the landlord's
action. The Massachusetts court has held that if the repairs are gratuitously made then only the tenant can recover and he can recover only if
the landlord has been grossly negilgent. 47 Still another view is that the
landlord's act must have left the premises in a more dangerous condi48
tion after the repairs than they were before the landlord acted.
CONCLUSION

It appears that the majority of American jurisdictions hold that the
landlord is not liable for negligent failure to repair if there is no covenant
to repair and no statute imposing a duty on him to do so. Even if there
is a statute, most courts do not hold him liable for personal injuries
caused by the violation thereof. However, if there is a covenant to repair,
there appears to be a growing majority of jurisdictions which hold the
landlord liable for injuries resulting from the breach thereof. Also, if
the landlord does attempt to repair and does the work negligently,
the courts are almost unanimous in holding the landlord liable for injuries resulting to the tenant or his guest.
555, 85 S.W.2d 501 (1935); Verplanck v. Morgan, 90 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio App.

1948).

13 Donahoo v. Kress House Moving Corp., 25 Cal. App. 2d 237, 153 P.2d 349
(1944); Barman v. Spencer, 40 N.E. 9 (Ind. 1898); Ginsberg v. Wineman, 314
Mich. 1, 22 N.W.2d 49 (1946) ; Bloecher v. Duerbeck, 333 Mo. 359, 62 S.W.2d 553

(1933) ; Crane Co. v. Sears, 168 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d 916 (1934) (employee) ; Mc-

Courtie v. Bayton, 159 Wash. 418, 294 Pac. 238 (1930) (housekeeper's son).
"Livingston v. Essex Inv. Co., 219 N.C. 416, 14 S.E.2d 489 (1941).
" In Livingston v. Essex Inv. Co., supra note 44, the court said that the landlord
is not liable for personal injuries caused by defects in the premises unless there is
a covenant to repair which he negligently performs. The court, however, by way

of dictum, quotes from 16 R.C.L. Landlord and Tenant § 565 (1917), to the effect

that gratuitous repairs negligently performed render the landlord liable. The writer

has found no North Carolina holding involving gratuitous repairs.
" 108 Me. 467, 81 Atl. 581 (1911); accord, Kuchynski v. Ukryn, 89 N.H.
400, 200 Atl. 416 (1938).

,"McDermott v. Merchants Co-op. Bank, 320 Mass. 425, 69 N.E.2d 675 (1946).
" Kuchynsti v. Ukryn, 89 N.H. 400, 200 Atl. 416 (1938); accord, R.sTATEContra, Roesler v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 2 I1. App.
mENT, TORTs § 362 (1934).
2d 54, 118 N.E.2d 621 (1954) ; Verplanck v. Morgan, 90 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio App.

1948).
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The North Carolina court holds the landlord liable only when he
undertakes repairs and makes them negligently. It is suggested that it
would be wise for both court and legislature to give careful consideration
to the social and economic conditions existing in this state, particularly
its low per capita income and increasingly crowded housing conditions.
Both of these facts are so well known that they are worthy of judicial
notice, and they seem compelling reasons for revision in this area of the
law. However, it is submitted that any change, to be effective, must
impose on the landlord the duty to repair, regardless of covenant, because the tenants who need this protection lack bargaining power to
secure covenants to repair from the landlord.
JAMES Y. PRESTON

